Background: The 2005-06 avian influenza (AI) epidemic in Dogubayazit and nearby provinces in Eastern Turkey resulted in 12 confirmed human cases and four deaths and the culling of millions of poultry. The aim of this study was to determine the behaviour and perception about AI and the knowledge of breeders whose poultry were culled during the epidemic and to assess the outbreak control efforts with regard to the breeders' experiences. Methods: Using a cross-sectional design, 510 households whose poultry were culled during the epidemic were selected to represent rural and urban areas of Dogubayazit. Data were collected via face-to-face questionnaire-based interviews in 2008. Results: During the epidemic 17.1% of the households experienced mass death of poultry due to AI, 61.2% 'helped' the culling teams catch and contain the animals and 31.6% reported that their children also took part in this process. Among those that helped the culling teams, 53.8% used nylon bags or gloves to protect their hands and 31.7% covered their mouth and nose. The findings show that epidemic control activities, primarily those of the Turkish Ministry of Agriculture teams, did not include the provision of information to poultry breeders. The teams' field activity consisted of culling poultry and paying the owners for the culled animals. Safer breeding practices were not promoted sufficiently and about half of the breeders stopped breeding poultry after the epidemic. Conclusion: Preparedness plans of Turkish Ministry of Agriculture for controlling zoonotic diseases need to be improved through veterinary public health and health promotion approach. 
Introduction
T he risk of pandemic avian influenza H5N1 (AI) virus or other flu viruses associated with high mortality in humans is ongoing. Delaying or decelerating local epidemics can decrease morbidity and mortality, and facilitate the control of a probable pandemic, minimizing its effects. The Global Agenda for Influenza issued by the WHO in 2002 highlights that research on domestic-wild bird and human-domestic bird interface is a necessary part of the activities aimed at epidemic preparedness. 1 Thus, poultry breeders are regarded as an important target group. 2 Promotion of effective safety measures among small-scale breeders, especially in areas in which the AI epidemic occurred, can limit both the spread of an epidemic among poultry and transmission of the disease from poultry to humans. Small-scale epidemics can be thought as opportunities to increase the level of immunity in the general population against large-scale epidemics.
The AI epidemic that occurred in Eastern Turkey in 2005-06 resulted in 12 confirmed human cases and four deaths. 3 Before the epidemic in Dogubayazit, AI cases were observed in Manyas (Western Turkey) in October 2005 and in Igdir (Eastern Turkey) in December 2005; however, after three children in the same family in Dogubayazit became sick at the end of December 2005 the epidemic entered to a new phase.
During the epidemic in which millions of poultry were culled and four people died, intense concern and anxiety was observed in the general population. The support of the WHO and the intense efforts of the primary health-care personnel of the Turkish Ministry of Health played a crucial role in the quick response to the epidemic; however, there was a lack of coordination between the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Health, as reported in a qualitative study conducted in order to document the epidemic. 4 Definitive data on which communication and information activities were performed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Health in local communities during and after the epidemic, and on safety measures used by poultry breeders and the behaviours that placed them at risk remain to be seen.
The aim of this study was to determine the behaviour and perception about AI and the knowledge of breeders whose poultry were culled during the epidemic, to assess the outbreak control efforts with regard to the breeders' experiences and to make suggestions for epidemic preparedness planning.
Methods
Dogubayazit is a district of Agri Province, which is one of the poorest provinces in Turkey. Dogubayazit borders Armenia and Iran, and has a population of 113 000. The mother tongue of the majority of the population is Kurdish, and 41.2% live in rural areas. The level of urbanization in the district centre is quite low.
The present study employed a cross-sectional design and included a sample representing households whose poultry were culled during the 2005-06 AI epidemic in Dogubayazit. According to data obtained from the District Agricultural Directorate, 6867 families in 83 small villages and 11 neighbourhoods of the Dogubayazit town centre had their poultry culled. In all, 1170 of these families were not included in the sampling procedure due to local security issues and transportation problems. We interviewed 510 families in 16 rural villages and all the neighbourhoods of the town centre, as determined by cluster sampling (cluster size was determined as 10). We used the probability proportional to size sampling technique to select the small villages and to determine the number of clusters for each village or neighbourhood.
The study protocol was approved by the local authorities and the Yüzüncü Yil University Ethics Committee. We interviewed family members aged !18 years who agreed to participate in the study, reported they were eligible to represent their family. In families with no Turkish speaking member, we interviewed via interpreters. Following an explanation of the study and obtaining verbal consent, we administered a 71-item questionnaire.
The questionnaire included 11 questions concerning the household and participant's demographic characteristics, 10 questions concerning information they received during the epidemic, 5 questions (including 8 additional true or false subquestions) about their knowledge of AI transmission and preparedness, 17 questions about the effects of the epidemic, such as health problems, travel restrictions and economic loss, and 28 questions concerning health-related behaviour before, during and after the epidemic. We collected the data between April and June 2008. The 2 -test was used to compare independent groups and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test was used to compare paired groups.
Results
In all, 270 of the families lived in the town centre (urban areas) and 240 lived in villages (rural areas). Among those interviewed, 74.8% from urban areas and 49.2% from rural areas were women. In all, 55.9% of the women interviewed were illiterate, vs. 15.3% of the men. Among the women interviewed, 10.6% had !8 years of education, vs. 17.3% of the men. There were no confirmed or suspected AI cases among the family members in our sample.
According to the design of the study, all of the families included were poultry breeders before the epidemic and had their animals culled. Among the participants, 82.0% reported that they were paid in full for their culled poultry by state agencies after the epidemic. Additionally, 17.1% reported that they experienced mass death of their poultry due to the AI epidemic and 49.6% of the families stopped breeding poultry after the epidemic. The negative economic impact of the epidemic was serious to moderate for most of the poultry breeders (table 1) .
When we asked the participants eight true or false questions about the transmission of AI among birds, 14.1% (urban 19.6%, rural 7.9%) answered them all correctly and 27.4% of the urban participants correctly answered the question on transmission via the feces or excretion of poultry, vs. 10% of the rural participants. The rate of correct answers increased significantly as the level of education increased (P < 0.001). Among those that reported they were informed about AI transmission (personally or through media), 23.9% answered the eight relevant questions correctly. In all, 37.8% of the participants in urban areas evaluated themselves as completely prepared and 27.8% evaluated as only partially prepared for a new AI epidemic; these rates were, respectively, 16.3% and 47.1% in those from rural areas. Table 2 shows that 61.2% of the participants reported that they 'helped' the culling teams catch and contain animals, and 31.6% reported that their children also took part in this process. Among these participants, 53.8% reported that they wore nylon bags or gloves to protect their hands and 31.7% reported that they used protective covering on their mouth and nose. Some other behaviours related to AI are presented in table 2.
In all, 8.1% and 9.6% of those from urban and rural areas, respectively, reported that they were informed about AI via home visits, whereas 4.8% and 3.8%, respectively, were informed by other formal means (brochures, meetings, etc.); the remainder reported that they received information from mass media (33% and 39.2%, respectively) or were not informed (57% and 50.2%, respectively). The differences between these urban and rural results were not statistically significant (P > 0.05). There were also no significant association between literacy and the various sources of information of the participants (P > 0.05). In total, 15.9% of the participants from urban areas and 6.3% of those from rural areas reported that they heard rumours concerning the origin and course of the epidemic that contradicted official statements. Table 3 lists self-reported AI-related behaviours before and after the epidemic among the poultry breeders that continued poultry breeding after the epidemic. All the before and after epidemic differences were statistically significant. The before and after differences were larger in limiting direct contact between children and poultry and consumption of meat from sick poultry while changes in breeding practices were relatively smaller.
Discussion
The AI epidemic preparedness and action plans, and various circulars concerning this matter prepared before and after the 2005-06 epidemic by the Turkish Ministry of Agriculture describe the laboratory procedures to be applied in suspected cases, disease notification systems, restrictions for animal transportation, poultry culling procedures and all other necessary measures to be employed at poultry breeding facilities. Nonetheless, educational activities to encourage safe behaviour among small-scale breeders and poultry house owners were not included in these plans. [5] [6] [7] [8] One of the statements made by the Minister of Agriculture when the AI epidemic was the primary social issue occupying the public agenda was, '15-20 millions poultry will be killed. We will remove all poultry. We will terminate all poultry breeding activities throughout Turkey (Bugün Gazetesi, 14 January 2006). This statement was never followed by the stated actions, but indicated the need for a more human-oriented approach to preparation plans. It is clear that in such poor regions of Turkey characterized by high unemployment, small-scale poultry breeding is an important source of income and an important source of basic nutrition. Through a public health approach, outbreak control activities should include informing the public about the risks, promoting safer practices and protecting people's existing resources.
According to the data obtained in the present study, it is understood that most of those whose poultry was culled were financially compensated by the state, in accordance with their legal rights; however, 49.6% of the households that bred poultry before the AI epidemic stopped breeding afterwards. In all, 75.5% and 8.6% of the households reported that their income decreased partially or substantially, respectively, because their poultry were culled or they experienced mass poultry death due to AI epidemic. The higher negative economic impact of the epidemic in rural areas may be attributable to the higher dependence to agricultural activities (table 1) . A study conducted in 13 cities in 2007 that was supported by UNICEF, the Turkish Ministry of Agriculture and the Turkish Ministry of Health reported that the number of poultry breeders decreased after the AI epidemic, causing significant economic loss to those families. 9 A circular concerning the culling procedures that was disseminated by the Ministry of Agriculture included the statement, 'There shouldn't be any persons present, especially children, during the culling work, except for the official team members'; 8 however, our data show that in many cases this rule was not enforced, and that adults and children participated in these activities in a manner that endangered their safety. It is clear that this application might cause apparent and serious negative results in case of an epidemic with higher infectivity rate for humans.
It was reported that regular notification of the public by mass media about the course of the epidemic and the measures to be taken had some important and positive effects during the 2005-06 AI epidemic. 4 The participants reported that the mass media was their primary source of information concerning the AI epidemic. However, our findings show that their knowledge about routes of AI transmission and safe poultry breeding practices was quite insufficient. Among the rural participants, the level of knowledge was much less than the average, which may be attributable to the lower educational level. Widespread use of safe practices may break the infection-transmission chain, and prevent or slow the spread of an outbreak, but our results show that the use of safe practices was quite limited, both before and after the AI epidemic.
Even though there was a statistically significant decrease after the epidemic, still, those who regularly wash their hands after working with poultry was 36.3% of the participants who continue poultry breeding during the data collection period, those who regularly cover their mouth and nose during they work with poultry was 20.3% and those who wash their cloths and boots regularly or sometimes after working with hutches were 18.7% (table 3) .
According to another study whose participants lived in three cities in which there were human deaths due to AI, the measures people take for protection from AI were found as not breeding poultry and avoiding any contact with them (52.5%), not eating poultry meat (7.0%), sanitary measures (5.4%), use of gloves and special clothing (5.0%) and keeping poultry contained in their hutch (1.4%) (9) . These results indicate that avoidance was the most common attitude towards AI and that implication of other safety measures was minimal, as in our study.
Avoidance of poultry was the dominant attitude underlying the behaviours observed in the present study's participants. The most common behavioural changes observed in our study population after the AI epidemic included limiting contact between children and poultry, limiting the wandering of poultry in people's houses and a reduction in poultry meat consumption. Additionally, about half of the households included in the study, stopped breeding poultry. However, only minor changes in hygiene and protection practices were observed. Knowledge about AI transmission and safer practices based on such knowledge was poor among the present study's participants, and measures aimed at limiting all contact with poultry were preferred.
In order to promote protective behaviours and safe agricultural practices, education and communication activities that provide specific and detailed information suitable to the requirements of the target population should be included in AI control plans. A study conducted in Thailand reported that there was a notable decrease in risky behaviours observed in high-risk populations as a result of public education programs. 10 Effective prevention of new AI epidemics requires that farmers are educated, especially those that live in high risk areas and in low socio-economic regions. 2, 11, 12 In 2008 AI education programs targeting children were initiated by UNICEF, the Turkish Ministry of Agriculture and the Turkish Ministry of Health. The Turkish Ministry of Agriculture developed detailed safety procedures and standards for large-scale poultry production facilities; however, small-scale and family-based poultry facilities, which are important segments of the poultry industry, 13 were not targeted by any programming activity, with the exception of preparation of a brochure. Ministry of Agriculture teams visited all districts and villages routinely and performed area studies before and after the epidemic for various aims. During the AI epidemic they were involved in intense activities, including culling poultry. As such, they had various opportunities to inform poultry breeders about protective behaviours. However, our results show that opportunities were missed for the most part.
Public health infrastructure based on the coordinated efforts of the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Health is important for effectively controlling zoonotic epidemics and coping with the related emergencies. 4, 11, 14 Cevizci and Erginöz reported that the Turkish Ministry of Agriculture should create a veterinary public health organization within its structure in order to effectively perform its responsibilities related to zoonoses and public health. 15 The results of the present study support this viewpoint.
The present study has some limitations. The generalizability of the results is somewhat limited because 1170 households in 34 villages were excluded from the sampling procedure, and as such, those included may not accurately represent the entire study area. The excluded villages were smaller than those included in our sample, had probably less educated populations, engaged in more traditional poultry practices, and received fewer governmental services. If we could include all small villages in the sampling procedure we might probably find much lower rates in level of AI knowledge and stronger negative economic influences of the epidemic for the rural settlements. As we preferred to interview Turkish-speaking household members, the level of education and the level of AI knowledge among our study participants may probably be found higher than the district population in general. The data collected in the study came from self-reports obtained almost 2 years after the AI epidemic, potentially limiting their accuracy. The nature of self-reporting suggests we may have encountered under-reporting of risky behaviours, and the study's cross-sectional design limited our ability to precisely determine post-epidemic behavioural changes. Based on the present study's results, we think that control activities during the AI epidemic of 2005-06 neglected the human factor in general, which resulted in people, especially children, engaging in risky behaviours. The results show that activities aimed at informing poultry breeders and promoting safe practices during and after the AI epidemic were not sufficient or effective. In accordance with the present study's results, we think the Turkish Ministry of Agriculture needs to improve its organizational and operational capacity by creating a veterinary public health organization within itself in order to more effectively control AI and other zoonotic diseases.
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Key points
The 2005-06 AI outbreak in Turkey resulted in 12 confirmed human cases, 4 human deaths and the culling of millions of poultry, and had significant negative effects on the poultry breeders included in the study; about half of them stopped breeding poultry after the epidemic. During the culling of poultry many poultry breeders and their children 'helped' the culling teams catch and contain their animals, without the use of appropriate protection. Culling teams and other officials did not communicate necessary information to the poultry breeders and did not sufficiently promote safety precautions during their fieldwork. Poultry breeders' knowledge about safety measures was limited to avoiding all kinds of contact with poultry, and knowledge of hygiene was lacking.
Turkish Ministry of Agriculture plans for controlling AI and other zoonotic diseases must be improved through a public health approach and a veterinary public health organization should be created within its structure.
